A Global Body and a Global Problem: The Curious Case of the G-20 and Securities Regulation by Nurizada, Tamilla
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 50
Number 3 Fall 2017 Article 7
A Global Body and a Global Problem: The Curious
Case of the G-20 and Securities Regulation
Tamilla Nurizada
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Securities
Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nurizada, Tamilla (2017) "A Global Body and a Global Problem: The Curious Case of the G-20 and Securities Regulation," Cornell
International Law Journal: Vol. 50 : No. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol50/iss3/7
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-3\CIN307.txt unknown Seq: 1  7-MAR-18 12:34
A Global Body and a Global Problem:
The Curious Case of the G-20 and
Securities Regulation
Tamilla Nurizada†
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643 R
I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 646 R
II. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647 R
A. The G-20 and the Local Currency Bond Market
Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647 R
B. The Financial Stability Forum/Financial Stability Board,
the G-20 and Securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649 R
C. The G-20 and IOSCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651 R
D. The G-20 and Cross-Border Securities Investments . . . . . 655 R
E. Credit Default Swaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 656 R
F. Crowdfunding and Securities Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658 R
G. What Can Be Improved about the G-20’s Work and the
Achievements of the G-20 in Securities Regulation . . . . . 659 R
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662 R
Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated the need for an
urgent and comprehensive revision of financial market products, instru-
ments and players.1  The root of the crisis stemmed from mortgage lending
in the United States: a lot of loans were given out to borrowers with ques-
tionable credit histories.2  A number of these risky loans were pooled
together to become securities and were sold as such to investors world-
wide.3  The securitization of these mortgages was meant to spread the risk
† J.D. Candidate, Cornell University, 2018; B.A. in Psychology, New York Univer-
sity, 2014.  I would like to thank the Cornell International Law Journal Editorial Board
for their invaluable help and feedback.  I am dedicating this Note to the loving memory
of my father Eldar Nurizada.
1. See Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Director, Financial and Enterprise Affairs, and Spe-
cial Adviser to the Secretary General for Financial Markets, OECD, Keynote Address at
ESMA Financial Innovation Day 2015 (Dec. 16, 2015).
2. See The Origins of Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-
still-being-felt-five-years-article [https://perma.cc/H68D-RH8P].
3. Id.
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among many investors and prevent a future crisis.4  However, the measure
only ignited instability because many global investors acquired these Amer-
ican securities to make high profits.5  Therefore, when the housing market
in the United States sharply declined, the mortgage-based securities also
experienced a sudden and steep decrease in value.6  The global investors
tried to get rid of their securities, which then led to market panic because
everyone started to resell their securities, decreasing the value of the under-
lying loans even further.7
Thus, securities were identified as one of the financial market instru-
ments requiring broader regulation worldwide.8  Although some central
banks in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States took immediate
action to resolve the securities problem (such as increasing the purchase of
long-term government securities), these measures were only short-term
solutions.9  Additionally, the global nature of the crisis required global
cooperation, with a body or organization setting the same (or equivalent)
standards for the global markets.10  In the absence of international cooper-
ation, countries will engage in a race-to-the-bottom: they will try to limit
regulation as much as possible to attract investors, issuers, and other mar-
ket participants.11  Deregulation does not work in securities area, and the
global financial crisis vividly showed its inefficiency.12
The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
(also known as the G-20) was created to organize international economic
cooperation in financial sphere.13  Comprised of the national leaders or
ministers of the member states, the G-20 is not a formal international
organization.14  In other words, the G-20 resembles a network because it
does not have formal requirements of membership, and the states have not
delegated decision-making authority to the group.15  The members of the
4. See Brian Perry, Credit Crisis: What Caused the Crisis?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/university/credit-crisis/credit-crisis4.asp [https://perma.cc/
2MBL-UZ6B].
5. See Manav Tanneeru, How a “Perfect Storm” Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/economic.crisis.explainer/index.html?iref=news
search [https://perma.cc/7YHX-QUSL].
6. Perry, supra note 4.
7. Tanneeru, supra note 5.
8. See World Economic Outlook April 2009: Crisis and Recovery, INT’L MONETARY
FUND 5– 6 (2009).
9. Id. at 6.
10. See Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137,
1147 (2016).
11. See Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for the Harmo-
nization and Centralization of International Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581,
1597 (2010).
12. Id.
13. See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 357
(2010).
14. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regu-
lation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1462 (2013).
15. Leonardo Martinez-Diaz & Ngaire Woods, The G20 and the Developing World,
GLOBAL BRIEF (Feb. 19, 2010), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2010/02/19/the-g20-and-the-
developing-world/ [https://perma.cc/2S3D-KT6V].
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G-20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the European Union.16  The decisions that the G-20 produces are based on
consensus and are not legally binding.17  Despite the absence of a formal
legal force, the organization can still have a profound effect on interna-
tional financial regulation.18  Firstly, the G-20 members control the major-
ity of the votes in the International Financial Institutions.19  Secondly,
these member states make up eighty-five percent of the world’s GDP; there-
fore, they can exert great financial pressure to force compliance with their
rules.20
Although securities regulators do not participate in the G-20 meetings,
the organization still expresses a number of opinions and communique´s
regarding macroprudential regulation of securities firms and products.21
In the light of the global financial crisis, the G-20 has announced a series
of agreed-upon reforms that involved important issues of securities regula-
tion.22  These reforms include required registration of hedge funds, regula-
tion of Credit Rating Agencies, regulation of derivatives, and enhancement
of the accounting recognition of loan loss provision.23
While it is true that the G-20 does not have the power to enforce its
policies and communique´s under the international law,24 the organization
still defines the objectives for the global financial regulation.25  For exam-
ple, the G-20 can establish monitoring bodies, enforcement measures and
technical assistance providers (also known as “enablers”) to aid the coun-
tries in their compliance with the newly promulgated rules and
standards.26
This Note will argue that the G-20 has achieved certain evident suc-
cesses in the area of securities regulation; although there is a lack of regula-
tory action in shadow banking and a number of structural factors affecting
the organization’s efficiency in achieving all of its goals, the organization’s
efforts make a difference.  Part A of this note will discuss the G-20 and the
Local Currency Bond Market Initiative and evaluate its success on the
example of ESMID program.  Part B will discuss the creation of the Finan-
cial Stability Board (reorganizing of the Financial Stability Forum as the
Financial Stability Board (FSB)) and the board’s achievements.  Part C will
discuss the relationship between the International Organization of Securi-
16. G20 Members, G20, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/ [https://
perma.cc/CTW5-RPQC].
17. See Verdier, supra note 14, at 1462.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Brummer, supra note 13, at 358.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 358– 59.
24. Id. at 359.
25. Grinberg, supra note 4, at 1147.
26. Id.
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ties Commissions (IOSCO) and the G-20 and IOSCO’s efforts to encourage
compliance with securities regulations.  Parts A through C will evaluate the
effectiveness of each initiative as well as its shortcomings and reasons
behind these weaknesses.
Part D will discuss the role of the G-20 in the cross-border securities
investments area.  Parts A through D will analyze the factors affecting the
G-20’s ability to achieve uniform and voluntary compliance with the
promulgated policies and standards regarding securities regulation.  One
of such factors lies in the ultimate nature of the G-20: the organization can
set standards and encourage the members to comply with them, but it can-
not internationally enforce its own laws.  Additionally, it is important to
keep in mind that securities regulators do not participate in the G-20 meet-
ings because they assume that the systemic risk presented by securities
cannot be properly assessed.27  Part E will discuss credit default swaps,
their role in the global financial crisis and the actions taken at the G-20’s
request.  Part F will discuss the crowdfunding, which prominently emerged
after the crisis, and its connection to securities regulation.  Finally, Part G
will conclude with the suggestions for the improvement of the G-20’s effi-
ciency in the area of securities regulation and evaluation of the organiza-
tion’s strengths.  This Note will conclude by explaining the complexities of
securities and securities regulation that complicated the work of the G-20.
I. Background
The need for more uniform international standards in the area of
securities regulation was evident even before the global financial crisis of
2008.28  Moreover, this was not the first time that the G-20 was trying to
harmonize securities regulation.29  The Finance Ministers addressed the
topic of securities regulation at the G-7 Finance Ministers Meeting in Feb-
ruary 2007 (the G-7 is similar to the G-20 in its mission and structure and
includes the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States).30  Ironically, the goal of that meeting was
to encourage free trade in securities to liberalize cross-border capital mar-
kets.31  The G-7 leaders failed to realize the riskiness of certain securities,
such as the US “subprime” household debt, which was greatly securitized
27. Brummer, supra note 13, at 358.
28. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Regula-
tion, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2 (2008).
29. Clyde Stoltenberg, Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey, & Michael
Cuthbert, The Past Decade of Regulatory Change in the U.S. and EU Capital Market
Regimes: An Evolution from National Interests toward International Harmonization with
Emerging G-20 Leadership, 29 BERKELEY J. INT.’L L. 577, 617 (2011).
30. See G7/8 Finance Ministers Meetings, G7 INFO.  CTR. (Feb. 10, 2007), http://
www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm070210.htm [https://perma.cc/6EKU-9BYU]; see also
G7 and G20, GLOBAL NETWORK, http://www.globalnetwork.org/g7-and-g20 [https://
perma.cc/R6EG-UHGT].
31. G7 INFO.  CTR., supra note 30.
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and partly exported to the European Union and other countries.32  As a
result of the domino effect, there was hardly a country left that was not
affected by the crisis.33
This failure and the subsequent crisis as well as a number of other
reasons demonstrated that a more inclusive international body needs to
supervise harmonization of securities regulation.34  The G-20 has several
advantages over the G-7.  Firstly, it includes rapidly developing countries
such as China.35  Secondly, although the global financial crisis came from
the most developed countries, its consequences were felt by less developed
and poorer countries as well.36  Therefore, the G-20 is better positioned to
create a set of regulations that will accommodate not only a select number
of the most developed countries in the world, but also more vulnerable
countries.37
II. Analysis
A. The G-20 and the Local Currency Bond Market Initiative
Local Currency Bond Market initiative was the G-20’s way to
encourage financial deepening after the global financial crisis.38  Financial
deepening is the expansion of the range of instruments, actors, liquidity,
and risk sharing capacity to enhance the stability of the international mon-
etary system.39  Although this initiative was not directed specifically at
securities regulation, securities were a part of the financial deepening.40
For example, the G-20 proposed that the World Bank Group (WBG) would
provide technical assistance to the countries with the highest vulnerability
due to the size of capital flows relative to the ability of their financial mar-
kets to absorb these inflows.41
As part of this technical assistance, the WBG created Efficient Securi-
ties Markets Institutional Development program (ESMID) in Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Nigeria to develop non-government bond
markets.42  Although these sub-Saharan countries were not responsible for
the global financial crisis, they had an estimated loss of fifty billion dol-
32. E. Philip Davis, The Evolution of Financial Structure in the G-7 over 1997– 2010,
221 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 11, 14 (2012).
33. Marc F. Plattner, From the G-8 to the G-20, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 31, 33 (2011).
34. See James Wolfensohn, G-20 Should Supplant the G-7, 26 NEW PERSP. Q. 13, 13
(2009).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. G20 Action Plan to Support the Development of Local Currency Bond Markets,
paras. 1– 2, (Nov. 3– 4, 2011), https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/
Tasks/Financial_and_monetary_system/Conferences/2011_11_17_frankfurt_action_
plan.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [https://perma.cc/8M8K-H6M8].
39. Id. at para. 7.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Developing Domestic Securities Markets, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/SecuritiesMarkets_Brochure_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MS65-P923].
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lars.43  The founders of the program realized that securities contribute to
financial and private sector development.44  Despite their importance for
economic development, securities markets are underdeveloped in many
emerging countries.45  Thus, the program facilitated the establishment of a
regional Securities Industry Training Institute to train local specialists and
enable financial self-sufficiency of the countries.46  This program also
involved the regulators to provide a framework for licensing of market par-
ticipants in the region.47
At the end of ESMID program, the WBG Management conducted the
assessment of the outcomes of the program.48  The program produced a
number of successful achievements.49  For example, ESMID helped the par-
ticipating countries acquire $950 million in new bond issues by streamlin-
ing approval and regulatory processes.50  As a result of the enhancement of
financial regulation, the time taken to approve bond issues in Kenya and
Tanzania was reduced to forty-five and sixty days, respectively.51
The ESMID program was especially critical in the emergence of Nige-
ria’s bond market providing affordable medium-to-long term capital to gov-
ernments and businesses.52  The program sponsored a number of reforms
in the bond-market area (such as streamlining bond issuance procedures,
reducing transaction costs, etc.) that produced a number of positive out-
comes.53  The domestic bond market capitalization increased to $36.42 bil-
lion, consisting of federal, state and corporate bonds.54  As a result of
increased capitalization, the bond market is more efficient in supplying the
long term capital needed to close Nigeria’s infrastructure gap which has
been estimated at $350 billion over the next ten years.55
It is fair to say that the WBG’s program was a success, considering the
results and outcomes in the participant countries.  The bond markets of
43. Dirk Wellem te Velde, Economic Policies in G-20 and African Countries during the
Global Financial Crisis: Who’s the Apprentice, Who’s the Master?, 23 AFR. DEV. REV. 380,
382 (2011).
44. Id.
45. End-Of-Program Evaluation Of The Efficient Securities Markets Institutional Devel-
opment Program In Africa (ESMID Africa), DEVEX (Mar. 28, 2013), https://
www.devex.com/funding/tenders/1887/1887 [https://perma.cc/Z8B4-FLJT].
46. World Bank Group, supra note 42.
47. Id.
48. Devex, supra note 45.
49. ESMID Home, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Reg-
Projects_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/ESMID_Home/ [https://perma.cc/
R8PA-RX9P].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Arunma Oteh, Building a Vibrant Domestic Bond in Nigeria, AFR. FIN. MKT. INITIA-
TIVE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.africanbondmarkets.org/en/news-events/african-bond-
market-review/article/building-a-vibrant-domestic-bond-market-in-nigeria-61665/
[https://perma.cc/GZT2-RG68].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Nigeria and Kenya continue their healthy development.56  The fact that
ESMID is planning expansion into the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean region highlights the success of the program.57
B. The Financial Stability Forum/Financial Stability Board, the G-20
and Securities
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) was founded in 2009 (through the
expansion of the already existing the Financial Stability Forum) to super-
vise the global financial system.58  Notably, the FSB’s membership is not
limited to G-20 membership; the board also includes Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, and Switzerland.59  The G-20 asked the FSB to support countries in
their effort to strengthen financial regulation.60  First, the G-20 asked the
FSB, together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to review regu-
latory and supervisory actions concerning local currency bond markets
that affect financial stability and make necessary recommendations.61
Second, the FSB was appointed to support countries in strengthening
financial regulation and supervision to facilitate domestic capital mar-
kets.62  Third, the FSB assumed responsibility for raising the financial sta-
bility issues regarding the emerging and developing economies to the G-
20.63
The board’s 2009 charter lists the mandates and tasks of the FSB in
the context of international financial regulation.64  Although the list does
not specifically mention securities regulation, review of the charter’s
remainder reveals that securities regulation is one of its implicit goals.65
First, the list of the FSB members included securities commissions of a
number of countries and IOSCO.66  Second, after the Seoul Summit in
2010, the G-20 leaders requested the FSB to recommend a set of regula-
tions for the shadow banking industry.67  Securities form an important
part of this industry because the shadow banking system uses securities
56. Katharine Jackson, Pension-Funding the Future: Encouraging the Sustainable and
Socially Responsible Development of Securities Market in Sub-Saharan Africa, 44 INT’L LAW.
791, 793 (2010).
57. INT’L FIN. CORP., supra note 49. R
58. FSB Raises Concerns over Implementation of G-20 Reforms, FOW MAG. (Apr. 18,
2011), https://globalinvestorgroup.com/articles/2809313/fsb-raises-concerns-over-
implementation-of-g-20-reforms [https://perma.cc/4TFY-UDUK].
59. Daniel E. Noelle, Who’s in Charge of Fixing the World’s Financial System? The
Un[?]der-Appreciated Lead Role of the G-20 and the FSB, 24 FIN. MKTS. INST. & INSTRU-
MENTS 1, 5 (2015).
60. G20 Action Plan to Support the Development of Local Currency Bond Markets,
supra note 38. R
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cecilia C. Lee, Reframing Complexity: Hedge Fund Policy Paradigm For the Way
Forward, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 478, 526 (2015).
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lending and repo transactions to fund hedge funds.68  Shadow banking
involves not only big commercial and investment banks, but firms of differ-
ent sizes.69  Although securities regulation was never the sole and explicit
goal of the FSB, a careful review of its tasks in the context of international
financial regulation demonstrates the importance of securities regulation
to the board.
One of the FSB’s unique advantages is that the board could identify
the data gaps revealed by the global financial crisis and close those gaps.70
Although the FSB has been regularly tracking financial data in a number of
sectors, including securities, it expanded its work in response to the G-20’s
request.71  The FSB joined forces with the IMF and, after extensive consul-
tations with the experts from different sectors, they produced twenty rec-
ommendations regarding four areas, one of which includes cross-border
financial linkages.72  This investigative work has a great potential in securi-
ties regulation due to the comprehensive information of both domestic and
foreign entities.73  For example, information on the exposure of domestic
banks to securities of nonbank financial institutions of foreign jurisdiction
is useful in the event a nonbank financial institution shows signs of
struggle.74
The FSB as an organization is useful in securities regulation because it
not only sets the standards, but coordinates other standard-setting bod-
ies.75  The board is also responsible for supervising the actions required to
realize the improvements of the global financial system.76  The FSB
launched a peer review program in 2010 to test the effectiveness of the
regulations developed by standard-setting bodies.77  This measure encour-
ages countries to conform to the promulgated standards.78  Although the
FSB’s membership is limited, it includes the largest and fastest growing
economies.79  Thus, peer review by these countries reduces the risk of non-
members’ failure to regulate securities to affect the board’s members.
However, the FSB’s efficiency is not uniform.  For example, the board
struggled to timely report the progress on over-the-counter (OTC) deriva-
68. Id. at 508.
69. Daniel K. Tarullo, International Cooperation in Central Banking, 47 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 1, 6 (2014).
70. Robert Heath, Why are the G-20 Data Gaps Initiatives and SDDS Plus Relevant for
Financial Stability Analysis?, 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/13/6,
2013).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id.
75. Emilios Avgouleas, Berle IV: The Future of Financial and Securities Markets The
Fourth Annual Symposium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law & Society:
Rationales and Designs to Implement an Institutional Big Bang in the Governance of Global
Finance, 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 321, 348 (2013).
76. Noelle, supra note 59, at 5. R
77. Peer Reviews, FIN. STABILITY BOARD (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.fsb.org/what-we-
do/implementation-monitoring/peer_reviews/ [https://perma.cc/Z27C-QS57].
78. Id.
79. Brummer, supra note 13, at 361.
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tives market reform among the G-20 nations.80  Certain countries’ failure
to cooperate due to their inability to move from the market analysis stage of
the reform caused this delay.81  Additionally, individual countries had
their own visions of the required reforms in the OTC derivatives market,
which often conflicted with the uniform regulatory framework.82  For
example, India refused to enforce electronic platform trading of OTC deriv-
atives because India believed that it could retain the flexibility of OTC
transaction by requiring reporting through a central trade reporting plat-
form and central clearing.83  This refusal undermines the goals of the G-20
because the countries like India do not conform to a uniform set of stan-
dards and expectations.84
There are a number of ways the FSB can improve its performance and,
as a result, increase its efficiency in the OTC derivatives market.  First, the
FSB needs to engage its members and encourage their participation to
ensure open, inclusive discussions that will lead to homogenous and bal-
anced regulation standards.85  Otherwise, the discrepancy in the countries’
compliance with the promulgated rules will create regulatory arbitrage.86
This arbitrage will reduce the credibility of the FSB as organization and will
further alienate the members.87
C. The G-20 and IOSCO
The G-20 was one of the first organizations that reacted to the global
financial crisis by addressing the possible solutions to securities regulation
at the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit.88  The goal of the summit was to update
international securities regulation.89  The leaders of the member states
asked their Finance Ministers to propose recommendations regarding
“reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly for com-
plex securities in times of stress.”90  In addition to these discussions, the G-
20 also proposed that issuers of risky securities (which were the root of the
problem in the global financial crisis) must hold a proportion of those
securities on their own account.91  This proposal was approved and imple-
mented into domestic regulation; for example, the European Parliament set
80. FOW MAG. supra note 58.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Angelique Leondis, The Global Financial Crisis: The G-20’s Most Recent Action
Plan, 25 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 315, 322 (2010).
85. Olin Wethington, G-20’s Stability Board Needs Firmer Footing, AM. BANKER:
BANKTHINK (Aug 2, 2011 7:24 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/g-20s-
stability-board-needs-firmer-footing [https://perma.cc/9MLB-PVZL].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Stoltenberg et al., supra note 29, at 643.
89. Id.
90. Joseph J. Norton, NIFA-II or ‘Bretton Woods-II’?: The G-20 (Leaders) Summit Pro-
cess on Managing Global Financial Markets and the World Economy- Quo Vadis?, 11 J.
BANKING REG. 261, 283 (2010).
91. Andre Gabus & Alexander Hawthorne, The G-20’s First Timid Steps to Prevent
Crises?, 34– 35 FIN. & BIEN COMMUN 1, 2 (2009).
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five percent retention on the accounts of issuers.92
One of the ways the G-20 can regulate securities is by exerting pres-
sure directly on IOSCO, an international organization devoted specifically
to securities regulation.93  IOSCO is the only world organization that con-
tains almost all securities commissions.94  In that regard, the connection
between the G-20 and FSB should not be underestimated because the FSB
oversees the work of a number of standard-setting bodies, including
IOSCO itself.95  The FSB also acknowledged the role of IOSCO as interna-
tional standard-setting body in the board’s charter in 2009.96
As a reaction to the global financial crisis, IOSCO set three main goals
in its 2010 principles report: (1) to protect investors; (2) to ensure fairness,
transparency and efficiency of the markets; and (3) to reduce systemic
risks.97  The organization stated these goals rather generally; that is why it
produced a number of papers and reports with more specific objectives.98
For example, IOSCO’s paper Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities
Regulators, prepared by the organization’s Technical Committee, explained
the sources of the systemic risks and encouraged the regulators to be mind-
ful of the gaps created by lightly regulated products.99  The paper pointed
out the tools available to the regulators (such as prudential and governance
requirements) and reminded them that IOSCO can help with disclosure in
international securities markets.100
In addition, IOSCO realized that the global financial crisis mainly
stemmed from financial innovations such as collateralized debt obliga-
tions, credit default swaps, and so on.101  Therefore, IOSCO urged regula-
tors to devise regulation with particular attention to the risks attached to
financial innovations.102  The organization recommended that the securi-
ties regulators review regulation of financing activities to ensure that evolv-
ing products do not escape regulatory coverage.103
IOSCO also provided noticeable guidance in the regulation of hedge
funds.104  Hedge funds are pools of assets, which are usually securities,
professionally managed through the use of investing techniques.105  How-
ever, hedge funds are not registered— and therefore, not regulated— as usual
92. Id
93. See Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 IOWA J. CORP.
L. 849, 900 (2012).
94. Id.
95. See Arie C. Eernisse, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in Improving
the International Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 239, 242 (2012).
96. Financial Stability Board Charter, FSB, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
r_090925d.pdf?page_moved=1 [https://perma.cc/3GTL-MR4B].
97. Karmel, supra note 93, at 851. R
98. Id. at 852.
99. Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators, OICU-IOSCO, Technical
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commission (Feb. 2011).
100. Id.
101. Id at 18– 19.
102. Id at 20, 51.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 54.
105. Karmel, supra note 93, at 851.
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investment companies in a number of countries, such as the United
States.106  The harms that hedge funds contributed to the global financial
crisis were so significant that the funds became a point of discussion of
several G-20 meetings.107  Finally, the G-20 decided that the hedge funds
should be registered by the national regulators and the funds’ managers
must report systemically important data to these regulators.108
As a response to this decision, IOSCO issued a report on hedge fund
regulation, which incorporated the organization’s own research and com-
ments from the public and the industry members.109  This report included
six recommendations aimed at investor protection and avoidance of sys-
temic risks posed by hedge funds, such as disclosure of managers’ conflicts
of interests and ways managers deal with those conflicts.110  The United
States and the European Union followed this report and responded with
legislation.  For example, the Dodd-Frank Act requires hedge funds to regis-
ter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).111  The European
Union also produced two pieces of legislation: one for Alternative Invest-
ment Fund (AIF)— which includes hedge funds— and Alternative Invest-
ment Fund Managers (AIFM).112  Major cross-border financial institutions
with presence in both the United States and the European Union will have
to conform to the Dodd-Frank and AIF/AIFM.113
IOSCO offers a number of advantages in securities regulation.114
First, as a standard-setting body, it can encourage the members to enter
into agreements to address issues such as sharing of data and coordinating
action on risks.115  Second, the organization can highlight the areas in
securities regulation that need urgent reform through its Technical
Committee.116
The problem with analyzing the efficiency of the G-20 securities regu-
lation through IOSCO is that IOSCO includes members besides the G-20
countries.117  These members are often emerging markets; thus, IOSCO
needs to formulate general principles that can accommodate these markets
as well as the developed ones.118  Considering the challenge IOSCO faces,
it is difficult to determine whether the G-20 exerts enough pressure on the
IOSCO to promulgate certain securities policies or IOSCO simply cannot
106. Id.
107. Id. at 858.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 861.
112. Id. at 864.
113. Peter Green & Jeremy Jennings-Mares, Comparison of Dodd Frank Act and EU
Regulatory Reform, MORRISON FOERSTER (2011), http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/
Images/Reg-Reform-PPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/W65E-YXQT].
114. Karmel, supra note 93, at 855. R
115. Id.
116. Jane Diplock, The Global Financial Architecture: Twenty-First Century Solutions, 19
AUSTL. ACCT. REV. 155, 157 (2009).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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implement these policies without hurting the emerging markets.  On the
other hand, the G-20 itself includes emerging markets (such as Mexico),119
which means that some of the emerging market countries participated in
the production of the regulations.120  Therefore, it is much more likely that
these participants will conform to the regulations in comparison to the
markets that are forced to comply with these regulations.
Although the cooperation between the G-20 and IOSCO is not always
perfect, a number of instances that demonstrate uniformity of goals in
securities regulation.121  For example, IOSCO has a program to help the
members evaluate their own securities regulation against the principles
promulgated by IOSCO.122  The G-20 endorsed these principles by recom-
mending its members submit to the Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP) and undergo periodic peer review using IOSCO Principles.123
Another example of cooperation between the G-20 and IOSCO is that
IOSCO Principles reflect the goals of the G-20 leaders.124  These principles
pursue three main objectives: (1) protection of investors; (2) promotion of
market’s fairness, efficiency and transparency; (3) reduction of systemic
risk.125  These objectives resemble the G-20’s goals discussed during the
Seoul Summit in 2010.126  Although the G-20’s goals targeted financial reg-
ulation in general, securities regulation is a concrete example of financial
regulation.  The G-20 paid a particular attention to the issue of systemic
risk; in fact, this issue was addressed almost immediately after crisis at the
Washington Summit in 2008.127
Despite IOSCO’s shortcomings and challenging diversity of its mem-
ber body, the organization has capacity to become more efficient in securi-
ties regulation.128  For instance, IOSCO’s cooperation with various bodies
such as the World Bank can be used to help IOSCO become a supervisory
convergence organization rather than a simple harmonizer of standards.129
Additionally, the diversity of the markets within the G-20 presents a
challenge for devising a common set of regulations because different mar-
kets have their own understanding of the necessary regulation.130  For
example, the United States and the United Kingdom prefer greater market
119. The Group of Twenty: A History, OFFICIAL G-20 PUBLICATIONS (G-20 Info. Ctr.,
Toronto, Can.), Nov. 2008, at 8.
120. Verdier, supra note 14, at 1420. R
121. Diplock, supra note 116, at 157. R
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Badar Alam Iqbal, G-20: Global Issues and Challenges, 4 TRANSNAT’L CORP. REV.
72, 76 (2012).
127. Hank Boerner, Global Capital Markets and Corporate Compliance Reforms Ahead:
The G-20 Tackle the Issues, 13 CORP. FIN. REV. 33, 34 (2009).
128. Daniel Broby, The Case for a Roadmap towards Financial Regulatory Convergence,
21 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 397, 401 (2013).
129. Id.
130. See Eswar Prasad, The G-20 and The World Economy: Sink or Swim, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION REP., 3 (2009).
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freedom, whereas countries of the continental Europe, such as France,
think it is important to have tighter regulation system, especially in the
aftermath of the crisis.131  Considering these differences, the difficulties in
achieving common objectives are no longer surprising.
Another commonly shared critique of the G-20 is that despite the G-
20’s diversity of the members, the organization still faces the same
problems as the G-7: too many leaders present in the same room and weak
political mandate.132  The increased number of leaders means that the time
that could have been spent discussing solutions is dedicated to the
rehearsed speeches of the leaders.133  Additionally, the structure of the
organization (consisting mainly of finance ministers) ignores the political
reality that some countries’ regulation systems are more complex.134  For
example, the U.S. regulatory authority does not consist only of ministers,
but also of several agencies that often have to share their authority; such
system complicates compliance with the promulgated rules of the G-20.135
Ultimately, the G-20 communique´s are not enforceable and that is
why the G-20 relies on the reputation of its members to conform to the
promulgated standards and policies.136  For example, if a G-20 country
does not conform to the communique´s, it will have a difficulty promoting
its own policies in the future.137
D. The G-20 and Cross-Border Securities Investments
The amount of cross-border securities investments had been steadily
increasing until the global financial crisis took place.138  For example, the
share of debt securities held by cross-border investors jumped by eight per-
cent from 2001 to 2007, whereas the share decreased by three percent from
2009 to 2012.139  Although the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Survey (CPIS) has tracked cross-border securities investments, policy mak-
ers have largely ignored these data.140  The global financial crisis demon-
strated the global significance of the cross-border securities investment and
the need for the G-20 to closely monitor the investments’ rates and issu-
ance of securities globally.
The Handbook on Securities Statistics (Handbook), joint work of the
IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank for International Set-
131. Id.
132. Jonathan Burks, Improving International Policy Coordination in the Wake of the
Financial Crisis, 20 J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 144, 146– 47 (2009).
133. Nouriel Roubini, It is a G-Zero, Not a G-20, World, 28 NEW PERSP. Q. 27, 29
(2011).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Brummer, supra note 13, at 359.
137. Id.
138. Branimir Gruic & Andreas Schrimpf, Cross-Border Investments in Global Debt
Markets Since the Crisis, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.bis.org/
publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1403y.htm [https://perma.cc/SSZ3-5UC5].
139. Id.
140. Heath, supra note 70, at 5, 10.
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tlements (BIS), represents an attempt to track securities information.141
The G-20 endorsed the development of the Handbook through the FSB and
IMF’s 2009 report “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps.”142  The
global crisis demonstrated that more stringent supervision of securities is
crucial to restoration of financial health worldwide.143  The three parts of
the Handbook provides data on debt and equity securities.144  One of the
benefits of the Handbook is that its data is internationally comparable
because the central banks and financial experts of a number of countries
contributed information.145  The availability of internationally comparable
securities data allows countries to come up with more efficient fiscal poli-
cies.146  The Handbook contains comprehensive information on securities,
including institutions dealing with debt and equity securities, differences
between subtypes of debt and equity securities, and so on.147
The IMF’s work in the area of cross-border securities also deserves
recognition.148  In response to the criticism that information from the
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) was relatively obscure, the
IMF decided to conduct the CPIS twice instead of once a year.149  Semi-
annual reporting should decrease delay in the release of results.150  How-
ever, there are still a number of weaknesses in the conduction of the sur-
vey.  For example, the CPIS should increase the number of countries
covered because at the moment only twenty-five countries that the IMF
considers to have systemically important financial sectors participate.151
However, the global financial crisis demonstrated the interconnectedness
of the global financial system.  Although a particular country might not be
systemically important, the decline of such country’s financial health can
severely affect a systemically important country.
E. Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps (CDS) are instruments supposed to cover holders
against default on an underlying security.152  In other words, CDS are con-
ceptually insurance contracts against the cost of default of a company.153
They are considered as a type of OTC credit derivatives.154  Issuers of these
141. Handbook on Securities Statistics, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2015), http://
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/wgsd/pdf/hss.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ST5-WC4W].
142. Id.
143. Diplock, supra note 116, at 155. R
144. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 141. R
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Heath, supra note 70, at 15. R
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Gabus & Hawthorne, supra note 90, at 3.
153. Rene M Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74
(2010).
154. Rama Cont & Andreea Minca, Credit Default Swaps and Systemic Risk, 247
ANNALS OPERATIONS RES. 523, 524 (2016).
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instruments have no obligation to retain reserves for potential liabilities
and, therefore, could issue unlimited quantities of swaps; it is not surpris-
ing that these instruments contributed to market destabilization in the
global financial crisis.155  The downfall of AIG is a concrete example of
swaps’ destructive role in the crisis.156
Thus, it is not surprising that CDS were on the agenda at the G-20
Washington Summit in 2008.157  The need for immediate regulatory
actions was so obvious that CDS were listed in “Immediate Actions by
March 31, 2009,” stipulated by all the G-20 leaders at the summit.158  The
fear of CDS’ systemic risk motivated some of the regulators to propose a
ban on the swaps; however, the majority of leaders (such as the United
States President George W. Bush) opposed complete banning and offered
more stringent oversight and regulation of the instrument.159  Addition-
ally, CDS can be useful means of risk allocation.160  However, the opacity
of the CDS markets destroyed its utility and contributed to the crisis; there-
fore, the need for restorative regulation was obvious.161
Although everyone at the Washington Summit understood that urgent
action was required, there was little consensus on which particular course
of action to pursue.162  The G-20 realized that they would need help from a
standard-setting body and, as in a number of issues in securities regula-
tion, they requested that help from IOSCO.163  After the Cannes Summit in
2011, the G-20 asked IOSCO to prepare a report assessing “the functioning
of credit default swap (CDS) markets and the role of those markets in price
formation of underlying assets.”164  This report was due by the next G-20
summit in Los Cabos.165  This report addresses issues raised at the Cannes
Summit, such as a need to harmonize policies across borders and increase
cooperation between regulators.166  In addition to these issues, IOSCO’s
report discusses recent changes and trends in CDS markets as well as pro-
vides information about trading, pricing and clearing of CDS.167
155. Gabus & Hawthorne, supra note 91, at 3. R
156. Cont & Minca, supra note 154, at 524. R
157. G-20 Wants Quick Action on Credit Default Swaps, but Bush Talks Them into Tooth-
less Regulation, WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Nov. 15, 2008), https://georgewashington2.blog
spot.com/2008/11/g-20-wants-quick-action-on-credit.html?m=0 [https://perma.cc/
W6MQ-GENG].
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. XAVIER FREIXAS, MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & RICHARD PORTES, MACROECONOMIC STA-
BILITY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: KEY ISSUES FOR THE G20 115 (2016).
161. Id. at 116.
162. Id.
163. IOSCO Publishes a Report for the G20 on the Credit Default Swap Market, OICU-
IOSCO (June 16, 2012), https://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS243.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MV2Q-4NDH].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of Name-and-Shame in Interna-
tional Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2012).
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F. Crowdfunding and Securities Regulation
Although the global financial crisis played a big role in attracting the
attention to securities regulation, new financial issues have emerged since
the crisis that require not only attention, but also regulation and legisla-
tion.168  Crowdfunding is an example of such issues; although the phe-
nomenon existed before the crisis, its growth has been expanding since the
2010s.169  Crowdfunding operates on web or mobile based platforms; its
operating nature can present significant cross-border issues.170  Lending
and investment-based crowdfunding is not regulated, although banks and
investment firms performing the same functions are heavily regulated.171
Some authors propose that lack of regulation in shadow banking allowed a
phenomenon such as crowdfunding escaping regulation for the most
part.172  Additionally, securities in investment crowdfunding projects are
not listed, which can create a number of problems such as the risk of dilu-
tion, capital loss, and so on.173
Although the G-20 never officially requested a standard-setting body
to intervene into the issue of crowdfunding regulation, the organization
definitely paid attention to this expanding area.174  The G-20 realized that
the aftermath of the global financial crisis forced banks to lend less and on
much stricter terms, and many SMEs suffered as a result.175  Crowdfund-
ing as an alternative source of financing helps SMEs that lack collateral or
credit history to satisfy banks’ requirements for lending.176  Crowdfunding
is also crucial to entrepreneurs because it provides an alternative source of
funding; entrepreneurial companies can be found in every single member
of the G-20.177  Crowdfunding is especially important in the G-20 member
168. Klaus Peter Follak, Crowdfunding in International and National Regulatory
Frameworks, 32 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 167, 167 (2015).
169. Giuliana Borello, Veronica de Crescenzo & Flavio Pichler, The Funding Gap and
the Role of Financial Return Funding: Some Evidence from European Platforms, 20 J. BANK-
ING & COM. 1, 2 (2015).
170. The Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, State-
ment on Addressing Regulation of Crowdfunding, OICU-IOSCO (Dec. 2015), https://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD521.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YYE-
NYBE].
171. Follak, supra note 168, at 167.
172. Roy Girasa, Shadow Banking: Nature, Regulation, and Developments, 35 BANKING
& FIN. SERV.’S POL’Y REP. 1, 4 (2016).
173. Advice: Investment-based Crowdfunding, ESMA (Dec. 18, 2014), https://
www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-1560_advice_on_invest
ment-based_crowdfunding.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KCP-NQJZ].
174. G20/OECD Support Note on Diversification of Financial Instruments for SMES,
OECD (July 2016), https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/financing-for-investment/G20-
OECD-Support-Note-on-Diversified-Financial-Instruments-for-SMEs.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QL7T-K5MX].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. G20 Funding the Future, EY, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
EY_G20_-_Funding_the_future:/$FILE/EY-g20-Funding-the-future.pdf.
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countries with lack of available finance such as China.178
However, the G-20 also realized the risks associated with crowdfund-
ing, primarily the concern about financial safety of investors.179  Once the
G-20 openly addressed crowdfunding, the need to take at least some kind
of monitoring action was obvious.180  Thus, several standard-setting bodies
decided to approach regulation of crowdfunding out of their own initiative.
For example, the IOSCO, duly noting the advantages of crowdfunding,
urged to strengthen regulation in this area to protect investors.181  Its sur-
vey findings from twenty-three IOSCO members in the “Crowdfunding 2015
Survey Responses Report” (‘‘Survey Report”) highlight major risks for inves-
tors that invest in crowdfunding.182  One of the biggest problems is the
absence of secondary market for crowdfunding securities, which may limit
the investor’s ability to sell or liquidate these securities.183
However, IOSCO refrained from proposing international standards,
explained that most regulatory regimes have just been implemented, and
therefore preferred wait-and-see approach.184  This approach might be the
most optimal one at this stage because the G-20 member countries differ
greatly in their approach to the role crowdfunding plays in their respective
financial markets.185  For example, the U.S. strongly favors crowdfunding;
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act provides venues for
expanding the use of crowdfunding.186  On the other hand, countries such
as Italy and Germany prefer to restrict crowdfunding through stricter regu-
lation.187  For example, Italian legislation requires its crowdfunding plat-
forms to partner with banks and other financial institutions licensed to
operate on traditional regulated market.188 In the light of these differences
and comparative recency of crowdfunding as alternative funding, IOSCO’s
reluctance to propose universal standards and rules becomes
understandable.
G. What Can Be Improved about the G-20’s Work and the
Achievements of the G-20 in Securities Regulation
One of the areas of securities regulation that has not seen many real
178. GPFI 2016 Progress Report to G20 Leaders, GPFI, https://www.gpfi.org/sites/
default/files/documents/GPFI%202016%20Progress%20Report%20to%20G20%20
Leaders.pdf.
179. OECD, supra note 174. R
180. GPFI, supra note178.
181. OICU-IOSCO, supra note 170.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Follak, supra note 168, at 170.
185. See, e.g., Therese Torris, Global Crowdfunding and Local Regulation: From Light
Touch to Prescriptive Bespoke Rules, CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 18, 2016, 11:10 AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/05/85762-global-crowdfunding-local-regula-
tion-from-light-touch-to-prescriptive-bespoke-rules/ [https://perma.cc/5VQF-TTSG].
186. GPFI, supra note 178. R
187. See Torris, supra note 185.
188. Id.
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changes is shadow banking, particularly securities financing.189  Shadow
banking involves non-banking entities, but these entities are also prone to
runs and contagions due to the leveraged nature of the financial product
involved.190  After the Seoul Summit of 2010, the G-20 requested the FSB
to produce recommendations on shadow banking.191  Although the FSB
responded to the request by proposing a framework of numerical haircuts
on securities financing in 2013, there was no regulatory action taken.192
Two years later, the BIS also produced their recommendations on haircut
floors for non-centrally cleared securities financing transactions.  However,
there is no legislative response up to this date from the members of the G-
20.193
The members provide various explanations for the absence of legisla-
tive action to bring recommendations to life.  For example, the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) highlights the fact that there is no harmonized
definition of procyclicality or leverage in the current European Union legis-
lation, and this fact complicates the attempts to implement the FSB’s pro-
posal.194  The ESRB also blames a lack of consensus on the difficulty of
designing a system-wide framework to tackle the build-up of leverage spe-
cifically applicable to securities financing transactions.195  On the other
hand, the ESRB admits that the FSB’s recommendations are internationally
agreed proposals.196  Thus, the absence of a harmonized definition of pro-
cyclicality or leverage cannot explain the lack of legislation in the European
Union, while three years have passed since the FSB’s proposal.197
Besides the lack of action in securities financing, the crux of the G-
20’s criticism comes from its ultimate structure.198  Therefore, the recom-
mendations for improvement will target the organization itself instead of
particular initiatives concerning securities regulation. G-20’s positive expe-
rience with the ESMID program suggests that the G-20 can meaningfully
affect securities regulation if the measure is targeted at particular coun-
tries.  However, it does not mean that the regulations aimed at diverse
group of countries such as the G-20 are doomed to be inefficient.  The G-20
189. Tarullo, supra note 69, at 13. R
190. Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework for
Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos, FSB (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130829b.pdf?page_moved=1. [https://
perma.cc/L599-92GZ].
191. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Haircut Floors for Non-Centrally
Cleared Securities Financing Transactions, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 5,
2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d340.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG8W-5J28].
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194. ESRB Opinion on ESMA on Securities Financing Transactions and Leverage under
Article 29 of the SFTR, ESRB (Oct. 2016), https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/
20161004_esrbopinion.en.pdf?eb4c21d49897bfc6f7036b502eb631c2 [https://
perma.cc/9DPU-56DC].
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needs to focus on factors that are common for both developed and develop-
ing economies.199
For example, the organization should prioritize increasing resources
for infrastructure development because it is useful both for the developed
economies as well as emerging markets.200  The G-20 should also ensure
that the organizations that were asked to provide cooperation (such as the
IMF) actually comply with the set deadlines to promote credibility and
trustworthiness of these organizations.201  The Group should also keep in
mind that when several organizations, such as the IOSCO, FSB and IMF
work on the same issue upon the G-20’s request, their actions can be
poorly coordinated.202
Despite numerous criticisms of the G-20, the organization has several
noteworthy achievements in the area of securities regulation.203  For exam-
ple, at the G-20’s request, the FSB has been conducting annual monitoring
exercises among its twenty four members in the area of shadow bank-
ing.204  Overall, the FSB’s role in developing specific measures to tackle the
consequences of the global financial crisis has strengthened since 2008.205
At the very least, the G-20 meetings resulted in providing frameworks for
securities regulation, which later were used to devise specific measures.206
The organization’s reports follows the work of standard-setting bodies such
as IOSCO to ensure that the framework the G-20 developed is used to pro-
duce actual results.207
The cooperation between the G-20 and the IOSCO deserves special
attention as another testimony to the G-20’s achievements in securities reg-
ulation.208  Firstly, the IOSCO’s Technical Committee created a task force
to help the G-20 in mitigating the consequences of the global financial cri-
sis.209  This task force collaborated with the BCBS and the IAIS to produce
a report Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation.210  This
report includes recommendations to reduce differences in regulation of dif-
ferent sectors, including securities regulation.211  The report explicitly
acknowledges that, “This report is part of a global effort to reform and
199. See, e.g., id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 79 (2014).
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205. Eric Helleiner, What Role for the New Financial Stability Board? The Politics of
International Standards after the Crisis, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 282, 285 (2010).
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Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 521 (2012).
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strengthen financial regulation by the G-20 Leaders.”212
Finally, it is worth remembering that although the standards promul-
gated by the G-20 and its partners (such as the IOSCO and the FSB) are
soft standards in the majority of the times, it does not mean that the lead-
ers of the member countries will ignore the rules.213  A number of factors
(such as the fact that people in charge of implementing securities regula-
tion domestically are not always political appointees) demonstrate that
there is more hope to the organization’s efficiency.214  Another advantage
of the G-20 is that the organization can provide unique supervision of the
regulations through peer review.215  Often, international financial regula-
tion requires cooperation between two sets of bodies: sectoral standard-
setting body such as the IOSCO and a broader organization such as the G-
20.216
Conclusion
Although the G-20’s efforts and initiatives in securities regulation were
not flawless, it should be kept in mind that the global financial crisis
brought unprecedented amount of instability and uncertainty.217  It is not
surprising that the G-20 leaders could not state more specific goals, espe-
cially at the first summits, because they did not have a full understanding
of the details involved in securities regulation.218  For example, the G-20
did not realize the significance of cross-border securities immediately.219
However, once the G-20 would realize the extent and complexity of a phe-
nomenon, they would take an immediate action.  The example with cross-
border securities serves as a proof; the G-20 endorsed the development of
the Handbook on Securities Statistics as early as in 2009.220
Additionally, securities regulation involves a number of subgroups
and issues, such as cross-border securities, credit default swaps, OTC deriv-
atives, and so on.221  As time passed, new related areas emerged, such as
crowdfunding.222  It is hard to produce the same high level of efficiency in
regulation of these numerous areas because of the diversity of the G-20’s
member body.  Sometimes wait-and-see approach, although not ideal,
might be the only workable solution when the regulatory regimes of the
member countries cannot be reconciled, as is the case with crowdfunding
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at the moment.223
Despite criticisms, the G-20 was instrumental in strengthening the
authority of standard-setting bodies such as IOSCO and the FSB in securi-
ties regulation.  Both organizations provided projects at the G-20’s direct
requests, as was the case with the Handbook on Securities Statistics and the
FSB’s recommendations on shadow banking.224
223. See, e.g., Torris, supra note 185. R
224. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 67, at 526 (2015); see also Handbook on Securities Statis-
tics, supra note 220.
